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Abstract: We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their
conclusions but we differ on some of their definitions and terms. Affects (emotional feelings)
should be part of sentience. Although the evidence presented for insect sentience is strong, we
list some of the counterevidence that should be considered. Our own research supports M&P’s
choice of arthropods, cephalopods, and vertebrates as the only sentient organisms with moral
status.
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) make a good argument that, for consistency, the same
standards should be used to judge sentience and moral worth in vertebrates and invertebrates.
Also valuable is how M&P assemble a large amount of literature on invertebrate (mostly insect)
sentience and cognition. We especially appreciate their pointing out that a capacity for pain is
used too often as the sole standard for judging whether an animal is sentient, when many other
affective states are possible (e.g., stress, starvation, pleasure) and should all be considered. Two
of the commentaries to date, however, have centered on pain despite M&P’s plea against it
(Elwood, 2020; Veit & Huebner, 2020). Although we agree with many of M&P’s proposals and
conclusions, we suggest that some of their positions should be further clarified.
1. Terminology and definitions. M&P do not always make it clear on what basis they judge an
animal to deserve moral status. In various places in the target article, the basis is said to be having
mental states, cognition, sentience, cognition plus sentience, flexible behaviors, or affective
states along with cognition. Most of these traits overlap, but some are fairly distinct (e.g.,
sentience and cognition), so it is difficult to know what the authors mean. Later in the text,
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however, they definitively settle on sentience as their basis for moral status, eliminating cognition
because computers have cognitive functions. Sentience is the correct choice, and most of the
other commentators understood that M&P were using it (Balcombe, 2020; Browning and Veit,
2020; Cammaerts, 2020; Elwood, 2020; Figdor, 2020; Levy, 2020; Soryl, 2020). We just wish M&P
had established their sentience standard at the start of the target article.
Many different terms besides “sentience” are used to designate the most basic, minimal
form of “consciousness” (yet another term). M&P sometimes use these multiple terms in
confusing ways. Table 1 is our version of the best usage, developed from our work on
consciousness (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2018, 2019, 2020). Most other sources agree with us,
especially that the basic type is called phenomenal consciousness and that this includes both
images and affects (Block, 1995; Mellor, 2019), but M&P do not.
Table 1. Proposed terminology for basic, minimal consciousness
Sentience ≡ phenomenal consciousness ≡ having experiences
and consists of two kinds of experiences:
A.
sensory experiences (including “images”)
B.

affective experiences (emotions and moods)*

*We assume all affects are conscious. For another view, see Adolphs and Anderson (2018).

A large part of the confusion comes from the way M&P use the term “phenomenal
consciousness.” They point out that it is a difficult and controversial term. Then they say it is
doubly “inadequate.” From this, the reader might infer that they are rejecting it; but instead of
rejecting it, they use phenomenal consciousness repeatedly without explicitly stating what they
take it to mean (although the context implies that what they mean is “being capable of
experience”).
What is going on here? The only thing that is clear is that M&P do not believe that
phenomenal consciousness includes affect — that it is only a “precondition” for affect. According
to other authors, however, when phenomenal consciousness is stripped of its philosophical
complications, it includes experiencing affects as well as sensations (Block, 1995). Even
Carruthers’s deeply philosophical and elaborated analysis (to which M&P refer) states that affect
(valence) is in phenomenal consciousness (Carruthers, 2018, p. 676), not a separate thing that is
glossed onto it, as M&P seem to think.
We would accordingly recommend that M&P include affect in their definition of
phenomenal consciousness. This will avoid errors and confusion; then they can say that
phenomenal consciousness, sentience, and experiencing are all equivalent (Table 1) and that that
is what imparts moral worth. M&P also use the key term “sentience” inconsistently. They first
define it as the capacity for subjective experience, but later define it differently, as affect:
"Phenomenal consciousness alone is not an adequate basis by which to establish the existence of
a welfare ... if things are to matter to an organism, it must be capable of experiencing states of
affairs as pleasurable or aversive.... We think this affective glossing of conscious experience is
better captured by the term sentience."
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The context of the target article indicates that M&P only believe in the first definition, but the
inconsistency adds to the reader’s confusion. As M&P’s argument now stands, the semantics lead
to a logical incoherence: Their current claims are that sentience is experience, that phenomenal
consciousness is experience, that affects are different from phenomenal consciousness, and that
sentience includes or even is affect. Sentience and phenomenal consciousness cannot both be
experience if phenomenal consciousness excludes affect but sentience includes affect, as claimed.
Again, the solution to this logical contradiction is to adopt the standard terminology of Table 1.
2. Counterevidence. Although M&P present considerable convincing evidence that insects have
both sentience and sophisticated cognition and learning, they do not include the experimental
evidence against these abilities. This counterevidence was presented in the article by Abramson
& Wells (2018), “An inconvenient truth: Some neglected issues in invertebrate learning,” which
M&P only cite in passing. Abramson & Wells report that the learning abilities of bees —
neurobiologically and behaviorally among the most complex insects — are sometimes more
specific and less flexible than those of vertebrates. Bees can become confused when either the
spatial location or the target cue for a learned food source is changed experimentally, even
modestly (cap-pushing test of Abramson et al., 2016; moved reward site of Sanderson et al., 2013;
changed target of Abramson, 1990). These findings are relevant because M&P urge against using
deflationary (simpler) cognitive explanations of invertebrate behaviors when more complex
explanations are applied to vertebrates who perform the same behaviors. It is therefore
potentially devastating when an invertebrate performs worse, opening the door for deflationary
accounts that claim bees are not sentient but just take unconscious shortcuts to solve problems.
Our point is that this valid counterevidence should not be ignored. We do not deny that
the preponderance of the evidence suggests that insects are conscious. We found two studies
that showed insect consciousness to be especially convincing (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2018, pp. 6062): first, the study by Fauria et al. (2000) where bees learned a complex two-part target,
indicating that they form and recall mental images; and second, the study by Perry et al. (2016)
where a pre-taste of a sugar reward made bees more likely to interpret ambiguous cues as leading
to the reward — a form of optimism. These bees passed the judgement-bias test, a standard way
of evaluating whether vertebrates have affective consciousness.
3. Why just arthropods and cephalopods? A strength of M&P’s analysis is that they attribute
sentience and moral status only to arthropods and cephalopods among the non-vertebrates.
Recognizing which organisms are sentient is difficult. Levy (2020) acknowledges this difficulty,
suggesting that we should not even try but should instead assign moral status to cognition, which
is easier to recognize. (This is rejected by M&P and Vonk, 2020.) More relevantly, Figdor (2020)
and Veit & Huebner (2020) acknowledge the difficulty by asking why M&P draw the sentient line
at these particular invertebrates rather than considering whether plants, bacteria, and all living
things are sentient. Our own work on which organisms have consciousness (Feinberg and Mallatt,
2016, 2018, 2019, 2020) suggests that M&P drew the line at the right place.
We derived which organisms are conscious from two logical (and ultimately testable)
assumptions. To identify the organisms with affective consciousness (Table 1), we assumed that
emotions are revealed by the capacity for global operant learning (extensive learning from
experience). We assumed this because this kind of learning provides double evidence of
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emotions: (1) the initial attraction to a reward (or aversion to a punishment); and (2) the recall of
the learned reward (or punishment) to motivate behaviors. Our criterion of global operant
learning is similar to the Unlimited Associative Learning idea of Bronfman et al. (2016) and
Ginsburg and Jablonka (2019).
To identify the organisms with image-based consciousness (Table 1) — mental simulations
of the sensed world — we assumed that any organism that constructs multisensory maps of the
external environment and of its internal body experiences these maps consciously as mental
reference-images for acting in the world. These maps are built from many senses and are detailed
enough that they can aid free-living survival, growth, and reproduction in the hostile world —
capacities far beyond what any known AI or robots have.
If we apply these two assumptions, the only sentient organisms turn out to be the mobile,
complex-brained clades of animals, namely, all vertebrates, arthropods, and cephalopods. We
documented both the high-capacity operant learning of these animals and the mapped neural
pathways to their brains in our first book (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016), then added more
documentation in our second (Feinberg and Mallatt, 2018). This reinforces M&P’s attribution of
sentience and moral status to just these three animal clades and not to other living organisms.
Veit & Huebner (2020), Reber (2016), and others do not think it is possible to draw such a
definite boundary between sentient and nonsentient animals. Yet there is a definite anatomic
boundary (rapid evolution of complex sensory organs and brains) and a definite historical jump
as well. The fossil record shows that the definitive characteristics of consciousness (high mobility
as well as complex sensory organs) evolved in the first arthropods and vertebrates during a
geologically short time in the Cambrian explosion of animal diversity between 550 and 520 million
years ago (Plotnick et al., 2010; Trestman, 2013; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2016; Godfrey-Smith,
2016). We encourage the more philosophical treatments of animal sentience to recognize this
often-presented and well-established leap, which also supports the conclusions of M&P.
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